The term Deceptively Similar describes certain tradecraft that money launderers employ to deceive the financial sector as to the pedigree of their criminal clients' companies, so that they are erroneously mistaken to be linked to, or owned by, prominent, legitimate and accepted companies in the global marketplace, therefore above reproach, and most likely even trusted. There are a number of proven techniques, some of which I have featured in articles, from time to time, especially when one is successful in misleading, confusing and defeating compliance officers.
Back in the day, I indulged in this drafting technique, which generally results in the company controlled by a criminal client being accepted for the purposes therein intended. One time, at a meeting with lawyers in Washington, my clients' shell company was erroneously linked to Continental Grain, though nothing could have been further from the truth. You don't always succeed with these ploys; once, a Caribbean corporate registrar caught on that my choice of a limited liability company would have caused others to believe it was linked to the British Royal Family, and disapproved it. Readers for whom details of this technique might be important for AML/CFT purposes, kindly contact me directly.
LESLIE KHAN a/k/a LES KHAN |
So, when, in connection with the new disclosures that appeared yesterday, in connection with a court filing in Saint Kitts & Nevis, in the MSR Media defamation case, regarding a Macau company named SKIPA INVESTMENT MACAU LIMITED, and that such a company paid LES KHAN, USD$1,359,200, after he left the St. Kitts CIU. Since Skipa is listed as owned by Caribbean Galaxy Real Estate limited, and administered by Galaxy CEO YING LIN, I paid attention. The reason is that Skipa is a well-known acronym used by the ST. KITTS INVESTMENT PROMOTION AUTHORITY, an SKN government agency that offers "investment opportunities." The Macau Skipa will, of course, be confused with the real government entity; not an accident, to be sure. Deceptively similar, of course. And what about Skipa's activities in Saint Lucia, where it also maintains an address? What role did it play there?
This raises a number of issues which require further investigation: (1) Was the Macau Skipa used to pay bribes and kickbacks, disguised as legitimate payments?, (2) What is the real purpose of the bogus Skipa?, (3) Was the Macau Skipa an artifice for money laundering? and, (4) Was it used to sell St. Kitts & St. Lucia Citizenships in Macau, posing as a real government agency?, and (5) Inasmuch as Skipa also has an address in Saint Lucia, what activities was it engaging in on behalf of the St. Lucia CIU in Macau? We hope that all these questions will be answered in time, during the course of the litigation, and the mystery solved.